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DoD Acquisition Insight Days



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Contracting for Development Efforts

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Overview

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- What We Learned from Past Acquisition Programs
- Industry Inputs
- Risk Analysis Considerations
- Fixed Price Risk Analysis
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- Other Considerations
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Background

- Age old problem; significant cost overruns on development contracts
- Not unique to DoD
 - Transportation
 - Energy
 - Construction
 - Technology projects



Background, cont'd

- GAO report 09-326SP, 30 Mar 09, "Assessment of Selected Weapon Systems"
 - Reviewed 96 DoD major defense programs
 - R&D costs 42% higher than original estimate
 - Causes include:
 - Poor program foundations and inadequate knowledge for developing realistic cost estimates
 - Moving forward with artificially low cost estimates, optimistic schedules and assumptions, immature technologies/designs, and fluid requirements
 - Changing or excessive requirements
 - Imbalance between wants and needs



Background, cont'd

- Moving away from the cost type contracts toward a more fixed price environment
 - What's changed?
- Senator McCain was the forerunner for pushing for expanded use of fixed-price contracts based on realistic cost estimates
- The outcome would be to enforce discipline in the procurement process; ensure clearly defined requirements; realistic schedules; and that costs won't exceed promised price



Is It Policy?

- Section 818 of FY 2007 NDAA repealed Section 807 of the FY 1989 NDAA regarding the determination of contract type for development programs
 - Act required urgent language resulting in Interim DFARS Case 2006-D053
 - As of 22 Jan 10, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs cleared final DFARS rule; DAR staff preparing for publication
- DODI 5000.02, Enclosure 2, Procedures, EMD Phase
 - Contract type shall be consistent with level of program risk; may be fixed price or cost
- Mr. Van Buren, SAF/AQ, Air Force Acquisition Business Rules of Engagement memo, dated 4 Feb 10, addresses Program Managers and discusses contract types for development programs
 - Weapons Systems acquisitions should normally begin with fixed price incentive fee or cost plus incentive contracts and move to fixed price incentive fee or firm fixed price for production



Is It Policy? cont'd

- DFARS 234.004 implementation language states Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) shall select, with the advice of the contracting officer, the contract type for a development program at the time of Milestone B approval
 - Include level of program risk and reason for proceeding with Milestone B approval despite the risk
 - The MDA must approve cost-type contract, based on a program being so complex and technically challenging that use of a fixed-price type contract would not be practicable



Is It Policy? cont'd

- Currently accomplished on a case by case basis as programs go forward on developing acquisition strategies
- Goal is to realize the benefits of a fixed price contract where the technology is mature and has already been operationally tested
- Air Force has committed to Acquisition Improvement Plan
 - As part of this *acquisition improvement* plan, the Air Force will emphasize realistic budgeting based on realistic *program* cost estimates
 - This is within keeping with the overall DoD goal



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What We Learned Past Acquisition Programs

- The use of fixed price development contracts was discouraged after programs start overrunning costs
- A400M – “an example of the problem posed by fixed-price contracts.” Jacques Gansler
 - EADS officials state seven governments should share the burden of the cost overruns because of changes in contract terms and designs forced on it by these parties
 - A-12 Avenger II, Advanced Tactical Airplane development started in mid-1980’s when defense spending less scrutinized.
 - The program was in litigation until June 2009 when US Court of Appeals made its ruling stating Navy justified in canceling program



Industry Inputs

- Contractors say the contractual and financial burdens are placed on the contractor
- They are concerned about a final price for a contract that could last almost two decades
- Boeing Chief Financial Officer James Bell stated “Fixed price development is a tough contract. It is very, very difficult.”



Risk Analysis Considerations

- Four elements must be aligned for successful implementation of this strategy
 - Requirements must be stable, detailed and technically sophisticated
 - Contractors must have clear understanding of the requirements
 - Expert contract negotiations of a fixed price incentive arrangement
 - Willingness to adjust requirements in order to meet the fixed price, if needed



Fixed Price Risk Analysis

- What are the similar development efforts by the known prospective offerors?
- Are specifications precisely defined and how have they been proven?
- How realistic and reliable are the Government's cost estimates?
- Is there an equitable allocation of the risk between the Government and the contractor?
- What are the indications that threat-related programs, and funding priority are sufficiently stable for a low probability of Government-initiated major changes during contract performance?
- What are the “off ramps”?



Contract Types

- Types of contracting methods considered for outcome of controlling costs
 - Firm Fixed Price arrangement – Government pays a set price, no matter the contractor's costs
 - Fixed Price Incentive – Government sets a maximum price, with a negotiated target cost and target profit
 - Cost Plus Incentive Fee
- Fixed Price Award Fee contracts



Contract Types, cont'd

- An award fee contract may be appropriate when contractor performance cannot be measured objectively
 - Provides for an award fee pool
 - Using a “metrics-based award fee criteria” should relate directly to the objectives to be accomplished and accurately measure the intended performance objectives
 - Not currently encouraged
- Incentives are the preferred approach

Other Considerations

- Development and production period of performance will impact schedule and cost constraints
 - May require supporting current technology longer which increases overall program costs
 - Avoid developing and maturing dependent technologies in parallel with system development
- Billing prices must be established for interim payment for fixed price incentive contracts
 - Contractors have valid complaint that cash flow will be impacted.
- If requirements change, expect requests for equitable adjustment from the contractor



Current Programs

- Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) a program out of Air Armament Center, is an acquisition pathfinder that is expected to lead the way for acquisition reform
 - Goal to maintain the airframe characteristic, flight dynamics and weight of the original Boeing 250 lb weapon
 - Contract type is fixed-price incentive
- KC-X Tanker is a Boeing 767-based offering
 - Contract type is expected to be fixed-price development
- The Total Integrated Engine Revitalization Program (TIGER) is an Army fixed price incentive contract
 - The program has a transition year with three program year determinations
 - The contractor's performance is measured by four metrics: engine availability, durability, cost, and weights assigned to four incentive metrics based on events of the particular program year.



What Can You Do?

- Develop acquisition strategy early
- Work with the Acquisition Team and Industry early
- Must enforce strict adherence to agreed upon terms
- Ensure experienced government personnel are assigned to the acquisition with appropriate fact-finding, negotiations, program management and technical skills



Take-Aways?

- Buy the right thing, the right way
- Bold ideas and sweeping changes cause a fear factor when in fact we should focus more on outcomes
- Is more policy needed or do we work with the tools we already have?